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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO SUPPLY
ADEQUATE POLICE SERVICE AND FOR
CRIMINAL ACTS OCCURRING ON
ITS PROPERTY
Judge Thomas P. Quinn*
INTRODUCTION
The inadequacy of police protection and service, long considered an
important political issue, has increasingly become utilized as a means of
imposing liability upon municipalities. Immunity for the inadequate provision
of police protection and service was codified by the Illinois Tort Immunity
Act.I This Act remains an effective shield to municipal liability and is
examined in this Article in three contexts.
First, section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act is looked at in its most
common and obvious form, as a way to immunize police for their failure
to prevent a criminal attack on another. Second, the interplay between
section 4-102 and the property related duties of municipalities is viewed in
light of the expanding tendency to hold owners liable for criminal acts that
occur on their property. Finally, section 4-102 is analyzed as to how it has
fared when it conflicts with duties imposed by statute or other common law
tenets.
I. MUNICIPALITY LIABILITY FOR POLICE FAILURE TO
PREVENT CRIMINAL ATTACK
Liability for inadequate police protection or service revolves around the
issue of duty. The question of duty, the legal obligation imposed upon one
for the benefit of another, is a question of law to be determined by the
court.2 In Illinois, the general rule is that a municipality is not liable for
failure to provide adequate police protection or service.' In providing police
protection, police departments and municipalities owe a duty to the com-
munity to preserve the well-being of that community at large and do not
* Judge Thomas P. Quinn, B.A., University of Illinois Chicago; J.D., Loyola University.
Judge Quinn is currently assigned to the Law Division of the Circuit Court.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 4-102 (1979).
2. Barnes v. Washington, 56 11. 2d 22, 305 N.E.2d 535 (1973). See generally PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 37, at 235 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
3. Marvin v. Chicago Transit Auth., 113 Ill. App. 3d 172, 446 N.E.2d 1183 (1983); Huey
v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill. 2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214 (1968); Adamczyk v. Zambelli, 25 Ill. App.
2d 121, 166 N.E.2d 93 (1960).
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owe a duty to specific individuals. 4 This rule embodies the conclusion that
a police department's negligence is not the proximate or legal cause of harms
committed by others.5
Ultimately, the existence of a duty depends upon choices between com-
peting policies. 6 Generally, if it is recognized that police owe a duty to
individuals, in the absence of special circumstances, the police are pressured
to make hasty arrests.7 More importantly, if police are charged with the
general duty to protect citizens, they are placed in the untenable position of
being insurers and guarantors of the public safety.' Police protection cases
invite court discussion of public policy ramifications that invariably conclude
that imposing such a duty would not be a desired social goal. 9 Allegations
that police failed to prevent a criminal act fare no better in federal court
since there is no constitutional right to police protection.' 0 Originally em-
bodied in the common law concept of sovereign immunity, municipal im-
munity for failure to provide adequate police protection is now contained
in the Local Governmental Tort Immunity Act."
Illinois courts have recognized that certain circumstances can exist whereby
police have assumed a "special duty" to a particular individual.' 2 In order
4. Marvin v. Chicago Transit Auth., 113 Ill. App. 3d 172, 446 N.E.2d 1183 (1983); Porter
v. City of Urbana, 88 I1. App. 3d 443, 410 N.E.2d 610 (1980).
5. Porter, 88 Il. App. 3d at 445, 410 N.E.2d at 612.
6. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 53, at 356-58.
7. Santy v. Bresee, 129 I1. App. 3d 658, 473 N.E.2d 69 (1984); Porter, 88 Ill. App. 3d
at 445, 410 N.E.2d at 612.
8. Marvin, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 178, 446 N.E.2d at 1188; Porter, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 446,
410 N.E.2d at 613; Adamczyk, 25 I11. App. 2d at 128, 166 N.E.2d at 97.
9. See, e.g., Marvin, 113 I11. App. 3d at 178, 446 N.E.2d at 1188 (police do not have to
insure the safety of every Chicago Transit Authority passenger); Adamczyk, 25 Il1. App. 2d at
128, 166 N.E.2d at 97 (municipality cannot be liable in tort for the failure of its police to
prevent people from violating the law).
10. Beard v. O'Neal, 728 F.2d 894 (7th Cir..), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 (1984).
11. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, para. 4-102 (1979), which reads in pertinent part:
Section 4-102. Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for
failure to establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection service
or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide adequate police
protection or service, failure to prevent commission of crimes, failure to detect or
solve crimes and failure to identify and apprehend criminals. This immunity is not
waived by a contract for private security service, but cannot be transferred to any
non-public entity or employee.
Section 4-107. Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an
injury caused by the failure to make an arrest or by releasing a person in custody.
The underlined portions were added by the Illinois Tort Reform Act, Public Act 84-1431, 3978
approved Sept. 26, 1986.
12. See, e.g., Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 71 111. App. 2d 373, 219 .N.E.2d 147
(1966), aff'd in part and remanded, 128 Ill. App. 2d 157, 262 N.E.2d 829 (1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 919 (1971) (duty to protect persons making identification of suspects from those
arrested suspects). But cf. Mallder v. Rasmussen, 145 Ill. App. 3d 809, 495 N.E.2d 1356 (1986)
(failure to carry out an arrest warrant does not impose a "special duty" upon the officer where
the officer exercised proper discretion).
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for a plaintiff to sufficiently allege that a special duty exists, the following
criteria must be met:
1) The municipality must be uniquely aware of the particular danger or
risk to which plaintiff is exposed;
2) there must be allegations of specific acts or omissions on the part of
the municipality;
3) the specific acts or omissions must be either affirmative or wilful in
nature; and
4) the injury must occur while the plaintiff is under the direct and im-
mediate control of the employees or agents of the municipality."
Few factual situations survive pre-trial motions when analyzed under the
above criteria. One of the few that survived was Gardner v. Village of
Chicago Ridge.'4 In Gardner, police summoned the plaintiff, who had been
the victim of a battery earlier that night, to identify four suspects who had
been apprehended. Upon arriving at the scene, the plaintiff was threatened
and berated by the suspects. When the police failed to intercede, two of the
suspects attacked and injured the plaintiff.15 The court concluded that because
the police had asked the plaintiff to come to the place where the suspects
had been apprehended, they should have known that they were endangering
the plaintiff and, therefore, had a duty to protect the plaintiff. 6
Even if the court determines that section 4-102 is applicable, however, the
more common result is for the court to hold that the requirements of the
special duty exception were not fulfilled.' 7 Typically, the requirement that
the plaintiff must have been under the direct and immediate control of the
defendants, causes the courts to hold that no special duty existed.' For
example, the court has held that no cause of action was stated by the estate
of a black man against a town for failing to protect him when it should
have known that blacks within its borders were frequently the victims of
criminal attack.' 9 There, the court determined that the decedent was not
under the direct and immediate control of town officials or police while
travelling through the town. Consequently, the special duty exception did
not apply. 0
13. Marvin v. Chicago Transit Auth., 113 Ill. App. 3d 172, 446 N.E.2d 1183 (1983); Curtis
v. County of Cook, 109 Ill. App. 3d 400, 440 N.E.2d 942 (1982), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 98 Ill. 2d 158, 456 N.E.2d 116 (1983); Bell v. Village of Midlothian, 90 Ill. App.
3d 967, 414 N.E.2d 104 (1980).
14. 71 111. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (1966), aff'd in part and remanded, 128 Ill. App.
2d 157, 262 N.E.2d 829 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971).
15. Gardner, 71 111. App. 2d at 375, 219 N.E.2d at 148.
16. Id. at 375, 219 N.E.2d at 150.
17. Neider v. Gacy, 121 Il. App. 3d 854, 460 N.E.2d 342 (1984); Marvin v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 113 Il. App. 3d 172, 446 N.E.2d 1183 (1983).
18. Galuszynski v. City of Chicago, 131 Il1. App. 3d 505, 475 N.E.2d 960 (1985).
19. Huey, 41 111. 2d at 361, 243 N.E.2d at 214.
20. Id. at 363, 243 N.E.2d at 216.
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A more plausible theory was attempted in Marvin v. Chicago Transit
Authority.2' While paying his rapid transit fare, the plaintiff was struck by
a youth in the presence of a Chicago police officer.22 The plaintiff requested
that the officer accompany him to the northbound subway platform but the
officer declined, explaining that since the youths had descended to the
southbound platform, the plaintiff would be safe. 23 When the plaintiff arrived
at the northbound platform, he again encountered the youths and was once
again attacked. 24 The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint as to the City of Chicago, finding that the plaintiff's injuries did
not occur while he was under the direct and immediate control of the police
officer. 25 Disjunctive allegations that the officer "directed, permitted or
caused" the plaintiff to descend from the platform, and that the officer had
failed to accompany him despite knowledge of the risk of harm to the
plaintiff, were not sufficient to satisfy the control requirement of the special
duty exception. 26
Illinois courts have literally interpreted the "direct and immediate control"
language used to impose a special duty on police. 27 Plaintiffs must seemingly
be in the actual physical presence of police at the time of injury before a
cause of action can be stated. 2 A recent example of this strict interpretation
of the special duty requirement is found in the leading case, Galuszynski v.
City of Chicago.29 In Galuszynski, the plaintiff phoned the 911 emergency
number to report that intruders were attempting to break into her home.
The 911 dispatcher told Galuszynski that police officers were on their way*
and to watch for them. Police arrived twenty-four minutes later, during
which time the intruders attacked and robbed the Galuszynskis.3 0 The trial
court dismissed the complaint and found that no allegations were made
leading to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were under the direct and
immediate control of police personnel." The appellate court agreed and
distinguished the Gardner case, where plaintiff had been "called into a
position of peril by police"3 2 and found the instant situation was more akin
to that found in Marvin, where plaintiff sought police protection which was
not provided.33
21. 113 III. App. 3d 172, 446 N.E.2d 1183 (1983).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 174, 446 N.E.2d at 1185.
24. Id. at 175, 446 N.E.2d at 1185.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 177, 446 N.E.2d at 1187.
27. Mallder v. Rasmussen, 145 Ill. App. 3d 809, 495 N.E.2d 1356 (1986); Tannebaum v.
Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 143 I11. App. 3d 572, 493 N.E.2d 143 (1986).
28. See supra note 27.
29. 131 III. App. 3d 505, .475 N.E.2d 960 (1985).
30. Id. at 506, 475 N.E.2d at 961.
31. Id. at 508, 475 N.E.2d at 962.
32. Id. at 508, 475 N.E.2d at 963.
33. Id. at 509, 475 N.E.2d at 963.
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The Marvin and Galuszynski opinions are very significant because both
courts rejected theories of liability based on police failure to accompany the
plaintiffs and police failure to respond quickly, undercutting two of the most
popular theories for establishing a special duty owed by the police. These
holdings clearly differ with those of other jurisdictions34 and cast doubt on
whether Illinois courts would recognize a cause of action where police failed
to protect a state prosecution witness from injury.3"
The immunities of section 4-102 and section 4-107 have served to defeat
numerous claims over the years.36 In Jamison v. City of Chicago,37 the court
held that failing to take a man into custody whose violent behavior was
reported to police was immunized conduct which defeated a claim by the
estate of a murder victim. 8 The Jamison court also held that the Tort
Immunity Act, which protects police from liability for law enforcement
action unless their conduct is wilful and wanton,3 9 is not a limitation on the
more sweeping immunities of section 4-102 and section 4-107.0 Courts have
found little difficulty in deciding claims for failure to provide adequate police
protection and service when the special duty exception is the only means
available to state a cause of action.4 ' Because of the strict interpretation of
the direct and immediate control requirement, the resolution of cases subject
to the immunity of section 4-102 is relatively uncomplicated.
34. See, e.g., Delong v. County of Erie, 89 A.D.2d 376, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1982) (holding
the city liable for the failure of its police to promptly respond to an emergency call on the 911
system).
35. The courts in Huey, 41 111. 2d at 363, 243 N.E.2d at 216, and Porter, 88 I11. App. 3d
at 446, 410 N.E.2d at 612, both refer approvingly to Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d
75, 154 N.E.2d 534 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958), which held the defendant municipality liable for
failing to protect a state prosecution witness who had received death threats for cooperating
with police. Schuster was shot, 19 days after helping police as he approached his house. At the
time he was shot Schuster was not receiving police protection. This situation is similar to Marvin
in that protection was not supplied. Because there was no direct and immediate control over
plaintiff by police, it is apparent that no cause of action would exit under these facts in Illinois.
36. See, e.g., Nieder v. Gacy, 121 I11. App. 3d 854, 460 N.E.2d 343 (1984) (police
department's failure to follow up on missing person case does not state a cause of action);
Santy v. Bresee, 129 Ill. App. 3d 658, 473 N.E.2d 69 (1984) (police department's failure to
provide requested protection or to warn of the release of a dangerous person from custody,
even if a warning was promised, does not state a cause of action); Porter v. City of Urbana,
88 I11. App. 3d 443, 410 N.E.2d 610 (1980) (police department's failure to investigate crimes
and make arrests does not state a cause of action).
37. 48 Ill. App. 3d 567, 363 N.E.2d 87 (1977).
38. Id. at 569, 363 N.E.2d at 88.
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 2-202 (1979).
40. 48 Ill. App. 3d 567, 363 N.E.2d 87 (1977). See also Luber v. City of Highland, 151
I11. App. 3d 758, 502 N.E.2d 1243 (1986) (failure to arrest a motorist, test for intoxication,
ask him to remain at the scene, or seek alternative transportation for him was not wilful or
wanton conduct under the statute).
41. Hernandez v. Village of Cicero, 151 Ill. App. 3d 170, 502 N.E.2d 1226 (1987); Luber
v. City of Highland, 151 II1. App. 3d 758, 502 N.E.2d 1243 (1986).
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTION 4-102 AND THE
PROPERTY RELATED DuTEs OF A MUNICIPALITY
A municipal corporation engaged in a nongovernmental function, such as
the operation of a public stadium or arena, a public transportation system,
or a public housing project, must conform to the same standard of care as
that imposed on a private party.42 While the general rule is that there is no
duty to aid or protect, the existence of a "special relationship" creates a
duty to take reasonable action to protect against risk of physical harm. 43
Lengthy discussion of the voluminous case law and authority dealing with
all possible forms of liability for failure to protect against criminal attack is
unnecessary for purposes of determining municipal liability for inadequate
police service." What is important to note is that a duty is much more likely
to be found if analysis is made under a "special relationship" rather than
a "special duty" concept. Although sometimes used interchangeably, the
terms special relationship and special duty are different legal theories.45 An
analysis into whether a special relationship exists focuses on the status
between the parties while an analysis of whether a special duty exists focuses
on all of the circumstances surrounding a given situation. If a special
relationship is established with a municipality engaged in a nongovernmental
function, then section 4-102 should not apply. Special duty, on the other
hand, is an exception to immunity once it is determined that section 4-102
applies.
In Comastro v. Village of Rosemont,6 the appellate court addressed both
issues, although the distinction between special duty and special relationship
was not clearly drawn. In Comastro, the plaintiff was assaulted by unknown
individuals after attending a concert at the Rosemont Horizon. The Village
of Rosemont owns and manages the Horizon and uses members of its police
force to provide security at concerts. The court found that the police owed
42. See, eg., Phillips v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 89 Ill. 2d 122, 431 N.E.2d 1038 (1982)
(public housing); Gill v. Chicago Park Dist., 85 Ill. App. 3d 903, 407 N.E.2d 671 (1980) (public
stadium); McCoy v. Chicago Transit Auth., 69 Ill. 2d 280, 371 N.E.2d 625 (1977) (public
transportation).
43. These "special relationships" which require imposition of a reasonable duty to protect
against harm, are described in the Restatement as follows: (1) carrier/passenger, (2) innkeeper/
guest, (3) possessor of land/invitee, and (4) one who takes voluntary custody of another under
circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(A) (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
44. For a good discussion of this subject matter, see Stalmack, The Illinois Landlord's
Obligation to Protect Persons On His Premises Against the Criminal Activities of Third Persons,
68 ILL. B.J. 668 (1980) [hereinafter Stalmack]. See also Lesar, Tort Liability of Illinois Landlords
for Crimes of Third Persons, S. ILL. U.L.J. 415 (1983) [hereinafter Lesar].
45. See, e.g., Santy v. Bresee, 129 Il. App. 3d 658, 473 N.E.2d 69 (1984) (court uses
special relationship and special duty interchangeably); Porter v. City of Urbana, 88 Ill. App.
3d 443, 410 N.E.2d 610 (1980) (special relationship and special duty used interchangeably).
46. 122 I1. App. 3d 405, 461 N.E.2d 616 (1984).
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a duty to the plaintiff because of the special relationship (business inviter-
invitee) between the parties. Because the village had received sufficient
advance warning of potential trouble at the concert, it was required to
exercise a reasonable degree of care to prevent physical attacks. 47
In addition to the duty owed because of the existent special relationship,
the Comastro court found that the police owed a duty because the village
voluntarily undertook to provide special protection to specific members of
the community. Because Horizon patrons were provided with greater pro-
tection than village residents at large, the police had a duty to perform those
increased protective services with reasonable care.48 This determination was
not even necessary because, as the court correctly stated, "[Tihe general rule
of non-liability of municipalities for failure to exercise general police powers"
was not applicable because the village was not engaged in a governmental
function.4 9 The latter finding merits consideration, however, because munic-
ipalities frequently provide one segment of the public with greater police
protection than another. The Comastro court cited the holding in Krautstrunk
v. Chicago Housing Authority0 to support the special duty created when
the governmental entity voluntarily undertakes to provide enhanced police
protection.5
In Krautstrunk, the plaintiff was an elevator repairman who was shot
while working on a vacant floor at the Cabrini-Green housing project.5 2 The
floor had been closed off in order to prevent loitering and criminal activity.
Plaintiff alleged that since the CHA had contracted with the City of Chicago
for greater police protection, the CHA was liable for negligent performance
of a voluntary undertaking. No facts were alleged that the risk of criminal
attack was increased by the CHA's voluntary security measures and this
theory was dismissed. The Comastro court's reliance on Krautstrunk to
support the proposition that greater police protection establishes a special
duty, is further questioned in light of the fact that the provider of police,
the City of Chicago, was not even a defendant in Krautstrunk.
Additionally, the Marvin court specifically rejected the theory that the
City of Chicago should be charged for "negligent performance of a voluntary
undertaking" when it assumed full responsibility for policing the CTA.5 4
The Krautstrunk and Marvin courts both believed that public policy consid-
erations dictated that municipalities should not be insurers against harm to
a class of individuals simply because those individuals were provided with
47. Id. at 409, 461 N.E.2d at 620.
48. Id. at 408-09, 461 N.E.2d at 619.
49. Id. at 410, 461 N.E.2d at 620.
50. 95 Ill. App. 3d 529, 420 N.E.2d 429 (1981).
51. 122 Ill. App. 3d at 410, 461 N.E.2d at 621 (citing Krautstrunk v. Chicago Hous. Auth.,
95 Ill. App. 3d 529, 420 N.E.2d 429 (1981)).
52. 95 Ill. App. 3d at 530, 420 N.E.2d at 430.
53. Id. at 530-31, 420 N.E.2d at 431.
54. 113 Il. App. 3d at 178, 446 N.E.2d at 1187.
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greater police protection than the public at large. In fact, residents of high
crime areas are, to some degree, provided with more police protection. It
would be inconsistent to analyze the claims of crime victims from one area
under a different theory than those from another area. The idea that special
police protection carries with it certain higher duties is a theory that will
surely be reviewed again but which should fail due to the sound policy
considerations expressed by the Marvin court.
Illinois courts have not considered the direct conflict that can result when
a municipality, in performing a governmental function, fails to provide
adequate police protection and service to an individual with whom it has a
special relationship. In DeZort v. Village of Hinsdale," the appellate court
imposed a municipal duty "to exercise ordinary and reasonable care" in
order to preserve the life of an arrestee known to have suicidal tendencies.,6
In a footnote, the court noted that application of the Tort Immunity Act
might have yielded a different result, although this argument had not been
raised by either party. 7 Due to the huge inventory of public land, munici-
palities should probably be most concerned with the duties incumbent to the
possessor of land/invitee special relationship. A hypothetical fact situation
will best explain the issues involved when a property related duty of a
municipality conflicts with the general notion of section 4.102 immunity.
Illustration
What happens when a municipality, pursuant to a governmental function,
negligently maintains its property thereby causing a criminal act to take
place? For example, how would the courts treat allegations that a burnt out
or missing street light contributed to a felonious assault by providing a
setting ripe for crime. Clearly, a municipality has a duty to maintain street
lighting once provided,58 but does this duty extend to victims of criminal
attacks? The crucial consideration is, of course, whether or not a duty exists.
In recognizing a duty, the court should consider the nature of the relationship
between the parties, the foreseeability of the third party activity, and the
maintenance of fair social policy. Sound public policy, in turn, requires that
the duty be based upon "the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the
burden of guarding against it and the consequences of placing that burden
on the defendant. 59
55. 35 Ill. App. 3d 703, 342 N.E.2d 468 (1976).
56. Id. at 710, 342 N.E.2d at 473.
57. Id. at 712 n.3, 342 N.E.2d at 475 n.3.
58. See Greene v. City of Chicago, 73 111. 2d 100, 382 N.E.2d 1205 (1978).
59. Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Il. App. 3d 97, 100, 302 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1973).
See also Krautstrunk, 93 111. App. 3d at 534, 420 N.E.2d at 431 (imposition of a legal duty is
not dependent solely on foreseeability of injury; courts must take into account likelihood of
injury and burden of guarding against it); Stalmack, supra note 45, at 671.
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The existence of a special relationship imposes a duty to use reasonable
care to prevent crime. Because the prevention of crime is specifically im-
munized by section 4-102, it would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme
to subject municipalities to the same duty required of others engaged in a
special relationship. Consistent with this reasoning is the 1985 amendment
to section 27 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act. 60 This amendment,
passed in response to the growing concern over liability exposure, immunized
the Chicago Transit Authority for failure to protect against and prevent
crime.61 This amendment effectively removes carrier/passenger from the
status of special relationship because the higher duty required by that status
is immunized. Likewise, section 4-102 immunizes municipalities, while acting
in their governmental capacity, from having a duty to prevent crime regard-
less of the victim's status.
Although a finding of special relationship eases pleading and proof bur-
dens, there are other circumstances where liability attaches for the criminal
acts of others. Most widely accepted is the Restatement requirement that a
party refrain from affirmative acts which expose one to a recognizable high
degree of risk. 62 Thus, parties will be liable if their acts create a foreseeable
hazard which did not previously exist.
Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services63 is one Illinois case illustrative of
affirmative acts which subject one to liability. The Chicago Housing Au-
thority provided a private security force for its residents during the hours
of 9 a.m. to 1 a.m. The plaintiff, who was assaulted at 1:15 a.m., alleged
that the CHA actions had actually increased the incidence of crime after 1
a.m. On that basis, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the claim stated a
legitimate cause of action. 64 In Ney v. Yellow Cab,65 the Illinois Supreme
Court recognized a duty owed by a cab company to the owner of an
automobile whose car was struck by a stolen cab. The cab company was
negligent because its driver had left the keys in the ignition and the motor
running. 66
These decisions would control a situation, for example, where police
apprehend a gang member and force him to exit the police vehicle in rival
gang territory where he is subsequently attacked. These opinions, and the
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 327 (1978) (amended 1985).
61. Id. See also Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, No. 86L-10380, slip op. at 5 (II. Cir.
Ct. June 18, 1987) (legislature intended to immunize the Chicago Transit Authority from liability
for the criminal acts of third persons).
62. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 302B comment e.
63. 82 Il1. 2d 313, 412 N.E.2d 472 (1980).
64. Id. at 318, 412 N.E.2d at 475.
65. 2 Il. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
66. Id. at 83-84, 117 N.E.2d at 80. Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 302B illustration
2 (no duty is owed under similar circumstances). Additionally, the dissent in Ney voices legitimate
concerns which should dictate a narrow interpretation of this opinion. 2 Il. 2d at 86, 117
N.E.2d at 81 (Hershey, J., dissenting).
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affirmative act exception, do not help in determining whether a municipality
should be liable for a criminal attack that takes place due to the darkness
caused by inadequate lighting. Failure to maintain a street light is not an
affirmative act which has created a hazard that did not previously exist. The
inquiry is still not complete because other exceptions have been carved out
from the general rule of no liability for criminal attack.
Although a landlord and tenant are not considered to have a special
relationship, 7 Illinois courts, through continual analysis of criminal attacks
in this setting, have found ways to impose liability upon landlords for the
criminal acts of others. In Phillips v. Chicago Housing Authority,6 s the
plaintiff decedent was abducted by unknown persons and violently assaulted,
raped, and murdered on a vacant floor of the Cabrini-Green Housing Project.
The trial court did not recognize a cause of action and dismissed the
complaint with prejudice. The appellate court reversed and remanded, and
the CHA appealed. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the appellate court
because the defendant had voluntarily undertaken to close off and secure
certain floors but had negligently allowed access to those floors through a
stairway and an elevator. 69 The supreme court rejected the argument that a
party could be liable only if its conduct actually increased the risks and
dangers of criminal attack.70
The Illinois Supreme Court in Phillips specifically declined to consider all
of the grounds given by the appellate court to support its finding that the
CHA had a duty to the plaintiff under the circumstances. 7' These grounds
are worth noting, however, because one of the exceptions could impact on
the hypothetical example of a burnt out street light contributing to a criminal
attack. In discussing the general rule that a landlord did not owe a duty to
protect a tenant from criminal acts, the appellate court in Phillips stated the
following:
Three exceptions, however exist to this general rule. The landlord may be
liable to the tenant if the injury although due to criminal activity occurred
because of a condition of the premises. In addition the landlord may be
liable if it attempts to safeguard the premises but does so negligently, or
liable if it attempts to safeguard the premises but does so negligently, or
if by his acts he creates a hazard which did not previously exist."
67. Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 78 II1. 2d 204, 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979).
68. 89 I11. 2d 122, 431 N.E.2d 1038 (1982).
69. Id. at 126, 431 N.E.2d at 1040.
70. Id. at 127, 431 N.E.2d at 1040-41.
71. Id. at 126, 431 N.E.2d at 1040. The supreme court never discussed this "condition"
of property theory of liability. See also Lesar, supra note 45, at 428 n.85, which states that
the Illinois Supreme Court, in Phillips, recognized lesser liability when a condition of defendants
property contributed to a criminal attack. While the appellate court clearly held this way, the
highest court said it would be unnecessary to consider all of the grounds for the appellate court
holdings.
72. 91 I11. App. 3d 544, 547, 414 N.E.2d 1133, 1136 (1980) (citations omitted).
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The latter two exceptions, which have already been discussed, are inappl-
icable to the maintenance issue involved in the burnt out street light hypo-
thetical. The first exception, imposing a duty if a defective condition
contributes to the criminal activity, represents an expansive departure from
the general rule.
This departure was first enunciated by the Illinois Appellate Court in
Stribling v. Chicago Housing Authority. 7 In Stribling, the plaintiffs were
victimized by three burglaries that all occurred when thieves broke through
the walls that separated the plaintiffs apartment from the vacant apartments
on either side. Noting the bizarre circumstances of the case, the court found
that the CHA had a duty to guard against the second and third burglaries
after being notified of the circumstances surrounding the first burglary.
74
Although the appellate court in Phillips followed the Stribling opinion, it
is a decision that has been distinguished7 and found unpersuasive. 76 Stribling
was however, recently relied upon in Duncavage v. Allen, 77 an opinion which
goes farthest in establishing a duty on a landlord to prevent criminal acts.
In Duncavage, a woman was raped and murdered by an intruder, three
days after moving into a new apartment. 78 Her estate filed a multi-count
complaint against the landlord alleging, inter alia, failure to provide exit
lighting, failure to trim high weeds, failure to provide adequate window
locks, and failure to exercise reasonable care by storing a ladder in the yard
adjacent to plaintiff's apartment. These actions allowed her assailant to
conceal himself and to illegally gain entry to decedent's apartment. Addi-
tionally, it was alleged that the ladder had previously been used to enter the
same window and burglarize the apartment.
79
Relying on Stribling, the appellate court found that the landlord had a
duty to prevent the criminal acts because similar incidents had previously
73. 34 Ill. App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47 (1975), appeal denied, 62 Iln. 2d 592 (1976).
74. 34 11. App. 3d at 556, 340 N.E.2d at 50.
75. Smith v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 36 Il. App. 3d 967, 970-71, 344 N.E.2d 536, 539-40
(1976) (unlike Stribling, the loss was inflicted by unknown persons and there was no calfsal or
other connection with, or in relation to, the property itself and the condition of the premises
did not contribute to the plaintiff's loss. "To impose liability in the case before us would
unjustly place upon defendant as a property owner a legal duty which is impossible of
performance.").
76. Krautstrunk v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 95 In. App. 3d 529, 532-33, 420 N.E.2d 429,
432 (1981) (Stribling found distinguishable and not persuasive because "bizzare" facts led
court to find duty in CHA to secure vacant apartment once CHA had notice of burglars' access
to plaintiff's apartment by breaking through wall); Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 58 11.
App. 3d 1029, 1036, 374 N.E.2d 1055, 1059 (1978), aff'd, 78 Ill. 2d 204, 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979)
(Stribling distinguishable because defendant, with notice, failed to act in a manner which would
have prevented thefts in such a "bizarre" fashion and plaintiff's loss is a direct result of
condition of the leased property itself).
77. 147 Ill. App. 3d 88, 497 N.E.2d 433 (1986).
78. Id. at 92-93, 497 N.E.2d at 434-35.
79. Id. at 93, 497 N.E.2d. at 435-36.
19871
DEPA UL LA W RE VIEW [
occurred which were connected with a physical condition of the property.80
The court noted that prior decisions had limited Stribling to its facts but
found no reason not to follow the legal premise imposing liability on a
landlord when a repeated criminal act occurs due to a condition of the
property."'
Duncavage and Stribling lend support to the position that a municipality
could be liable for a criminal attack that allegedly takes place because of
insufficient street lighting. Overriding policy considerations dictate, however,
that such a duty not be imposed. The next several paragraphs deal with
possible outcomes of the hypothetical problem.
Illinois courts could determine that section 4-102 immunizes municipalities
from liability for all criminal acts. The recent additions to section 4-102 by
the Tort Reform Act8 2 and the extension of this immunity to the CTA in
the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act, 3 evinces a legislative desire to shield
governmental bodies from liability. Although section 4-102 is entitled "Police
Protection" and ch. 85, art. IV is entitled "Police and Correctional Activ-
ities," the broad language in section 4-102 that immunizes public entities for
failing to prevent the commission of crimes, could be interpreted to apply
to all municipal activity.
Furthermore, imposing such a duty on a municipality under the hypo-
thetical fact situation would require the courts to find that the city breached
its property related duty and that the criminal act was an intervening event
that was reasonably foreseeable so as not to break the causal chain. Because
the same fact pattern is involved, the identical result should be reached if
analysis is instead made as to whether or not there is a legal duty to prevent
a crime caused by a condition of municipal property. Since this second
analysis is controlled by section 4-102 immunity, it could be argued that
imposition of liability under the first theory would be a semantical circum-
vention of legislative intent.
Duncavage and Stribling are appellate court decisions which seem at odds
with the Illinois Supreme Court opinion in Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc. 4
In Fancil, plaintiff, a police officer, was killed when ambushed by suspected
burglars while checking defendant's store. Defendant, whose business had
experienced prior criminal activity, was allegedly negligent for disconnecting
a mercury light that had been used for exterior illumination. After finding
a special relationship between the parties, the court ruled that there was no
duty to use reasonable care to protect the decedent.85 The court based its
80. Id. at 98, 497 N.E.2d at 438-39.
81. Id. at 98, 497 N.E.2d at 439. The Duncavage court, for reasons not germane hereto,
also found a duty based upon violations of the Chicago Building Code and the Consumer
Fraud Act. Id. at 100-02, 497 N.E.2d at 440-42.
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 4-102 (1985).
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 327 (1985).
84. 60 11. 2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975).
85. Id. at 560, 328 N.E.2d at 541.
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ruling on the Restatement of Torts which subjects a possessor of land to
liability for a condition of his property only if he expects invitees will not
realize the danger or will fail to protect themselves from it.86 The fact that
the property was not illuminated, the court held, was a condition obvious
to all.87 Although the Fancil court emphasized that the decedent was involved
in a risky occupation, that fact alone cannot explain the apparent higher
duty required of landlords to their tenants. This is especially true since Fancil
involved a special relationship while Duncavage and Stribling did not. This
raises the possibility that the Illinois Supreme Court will not follow decisions
which hold a party liable for criminal acts that occur because of a condition
of the defendant's property.
These decisions could be reconciled, however, if Illinois courts recognize
that special circumstances surround the landlord/tenant relationship which
justify imposition of this higher duty. Duncavage and Stribling dealt with
negligent conduct on the part of defendants that provided criminals with
access to places where they did not belong. The causation factor is less
speculative and the ability to prevent the acts is more certain. An assailant
on public property, on the other hand, has a right to be where he is, and
the idea that the provision of lighting would have safeguarded the victim is
conjecture. As the Fancil court noted, there is always a danger of being
ambushed by criminals lurking behind objects and in poorly illuminated
areas. The burden of guarding against all such conditions on public property
is far greater than the actions which would have been required of the lessors
in Duncavage and Stribling to prevent illegal access to plaintiffs' homes.
Public policy ramifications are another consideration involved in the res-
olution of duty in the hypothetical fact pattern. Several courts have recog-
nized the valuable evidence an assailant provides on the issue of causation."8
Police efforts at apprehension should not be hampered by concerns over
exposing their employer to liability. This is a conflict the courts may wish
to avoid.
A strong case can be made for protecting municipalities from the type of
liability lessors are exposed to when the condition of their property leads to
a criminal act. Conversely, it would not be inconsistent with current judicial
trends for courts to impose such a duty. The only certainty is that the higher
courts will be confronted with this issue in the near future.
The mere existence of a criminal condition on the public way should never
be sufficient to establish a duty on a municipality. For example, police
86. Id. at 557, 328 N.E.2d at 541 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 343(b)).
87. Id. at 558, 328 N.E.2d at 541.
88. Duncavage, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 97, 497 N.E.2d at 438. See also Schuster v. City of
New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 84, 154 N.E.2d 534, 539, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 272 (1958) (civic duty
and right to inform authorities; informant becomes government's "agent" and municipality
may be held liable for any injury he suffers due to police department's negligence). See infra
note 114.
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knowledge of an outbreak of "smash and grab" crime at a certain location,
although clearly a danger to motorists, should not subject a municipality to
liability for failure to warn of a dangerous condition on its roadway. In this
case it is the failure to eradicate crime-an omission immunized by section
4-102-that really forms the basis of the complaint. In its role as possessor
of land, a municipality, if it is to have a duty for the criminal acts of others,
should have that duty only if the dangerous condition is totally independent
of any perceived inadequacies in police service.
III. STATUTORY DUTIES AND CLASSIFICATION OF POLICE ACTIVITY
In view of the relative difficulty of pleading a special relationship and
duty thereunder or of fulfilling the four requirements of a special duty
exception, 9 plaintiffs have alleged alternative theories based on statutory
duties. The argument then becomes that section 4-102 immunity does not
defeat their claim because inadequate police service is not the basis or the
exclusive theory for recovery. The first step in any analysis, however, is
whether section 4-102 is applicable.
Two appellate court decisions demonstrate the importance to litigants of
the manner in which their claims are characterized by the court. In Barth v.
Board of Education," the court held that the provision of a 911 emergency
program for ambulance service, although administered by police, was not
afforded section 4-102 immunity.9' On the other hand, in Long v. Soder-
quist,92 the failure of police to warn of disabled vehicles protruding onto the
roadway was held to be immunized conduct.93 Although plaintiff's claims
were clearly phrased in terms of a duty to keep the highway safe or to warn
of a dangerous condition, the court felt that the underlying theory was
actually a "failure to provide adequate police protection or service." 94
Two philosophies exist concerning the treatment of alternative theories of
liability once section 4-102 is determined to apply. In Galuszynski v. City
of Chicago9" and Mallder v. Rasmussen,9 the appellate court refused to
consider theories of liability that conflicted with section 4-102 immunity.
In Galuszynski the court addressed the conflict presented by the 911 Act 97
which imposes liability upon operators for wilful and wanton misconduct.
The court held that to subject the city to such liability would require a
89. See supra notes 13 & 46 and accompanying text.
90. 141 Ill. App. 3d 266, 490 N.E.2d 77 (1986).
91. Id. at 279, 490 N.E.2d at 86.
92. 126 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 467 N.E.2d 1153 (1984).
93. Id. at 1065, 467 N.E.2d at 1157.
94. Id. at 1065, 467 N.E.2d at 1157 (emphasis in original) (quoting ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
85, para. 4-102 (1985)).
95. 131 Ill. App. 3d 505, 475 N.E.2d 960 (1985).
96. 145 Ill. App. 3d 809, 495 N.E.2d 1356 (1986).
97. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 134, paras. 31-46 (1985).
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finding that the 911 Act implicitly repealed section 4-102. 98 The court was
unwilling to so find and affirmed dismissal of the claim for the reasons
previously mentioned. 9
Similarly, in Mallder, the appellate court stated that subjecting a sheriff
to liability for his statutory violation I°0 of failing to execute an arrest warrant
"would obfuscate the legislature's intentions under sections 4-102 and 4-107
of the Tort Immunity Act." 10 1 The defendant failed to arrest the subject of
an arrest warrant whom he had observed drinking at a private residence.
The subject subsequently, while under the influence of alcohol, caused an
accident resulting in the death of plaintiff's decedent. 10 2
The other line of reasoning followed by Illinois courts is to treat the
alternative theories separate and apart from the allegations that are found
immunized under section 4-102. For example, in Curtis v. County of Cook, 103
the plaintiff sued for injuries she received when the car in which she was
riding lost control and struck a signpost. The driver was drag racing his
vehicle on a road constantly and repeatedly used for that purpose. Plaintiff
alleged that the police failed to adequately patrol the area to prevent speeding,
and, alternatively, that placement of signposts used to measure the distance
of races constituted negligent design." 4 The Illinois Supreme Court considered
the property related duty10 5 separately from the police patrol issue, but found
no liability under either theory.
In summary, while Long represents an expansive application of section 4-
102 immunity, Barth represents a narrow one. Many courts display a will-
ingness to consider alternative theories of municipal liability when inadequate
police service is alleged"' 6 but seem inclined to follow the result of their
98. 131 Il1. App. 3d at 509, 475 N.E.2d at 963.
99. Id. It is the author's opinion that the obvious conflict in the First District between the
Fourth Division in Barth, and the Second Division in Galuszynski is reconcilable only if the
Barth decision is construed to apply to 911 service other than police.
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 125, para. 16 (1985) (where sheriff may be held liable to injured
third party for failure to perform command of warrant).
101. 145 111. App. 3d at 813, 495 N.E.2d at 1358.
102. Id. at 810, 495 N.E.2d at 1357.
103. 109 I1. App. 3d 400, 440 N.E.2d 942 (1982), modified, 98 Ill. 2d 158, 456 N.E.2d 116
(1983).
104. 109 I1. App. 3d at 402, 440 N.E.2d at 943-44.
105. The property related duty is contained at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, paras. 3-102, 3-103
(1985).
106. See, e.g., Marvin v. Chicago Transit Auth., 113 Ill. App. 3d 172, 446 N.E.2d 1183
(1983) (city properly dismissed as party defendant in absence of allegation that plaintiff under
direct control of city police when assaulted on subway platform; court also held common carrier
exception to tort~immunity statute inapplicable to plaintiff's action against city for assault; city
not liable even though Metropolitan Transit Act denied tort immunity); Curtis v. County of
Cook, 109 Ill. App. 3d 400, 440 N.E.2d 942 (1982) (court considered negligence under police
patrol issues and found no liability, but found liability under inadequate design theory), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 98 Ill. 2d 158, 456 N.E. 2d 116 (1983). Another good example of the
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special duty findings.""0 Other courts, such as the Galuszynski and the Mallder
courts, treat these alternative theories of liability as inconsistent with the
intent of section 4-102 and choose to ignore them.'0
CONCLUSION
Determination of municipal responsibility for the failure to provide ade-
quate police service or protection depends, in large part, upon the legal
framework in which the facts are analyzed. Defendants clearly want the
situation considered a police service issue so that the immunity of section 4-
102 is defeated only by compliance with the strict special duty exceptions.
Any pendent theories of recovery should be ignored in that they misrepresent
the true premise of the cause of action or require implicit repeal of section
4-102 immunity.
Defendants should prepare arguments that focus on the public policy
implications of imposing a duty on municipalities for the criminal acts of
others. Circumstances may exist whereby the opportunity for crime has been
negligently enhanced. It is a more speculative task to determine the cause or
motivation of a criminal act. Since this evidence is best provided by the
criminal, it may not be in the interest of police to capture him.? 9 Public
policy would favor apprehension of criminals unrestricted by concerns of
potential liability.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, want to avert section 4-102 application by
alleging a special relationship or violation of some municipal duty, other
than inadequate police service. If section 4-102 is deemed applicable, plain-
tiffs should strenuously argue for separate consideration of their alternative
theories for recovery. In this context, it is probably best to exclude any
separate consideration issue is Marshall v. Ellison, 132 Ill. App. 3d 732, 477 N.E.2d 830 (1985)
(no special duty owed to intoxicated individual struck on the roadside after police stopped his
car en route to emergency call and told individual to get off the roadway; no legislative intent
to create cause of action for failure to take a person into custody when statute provides that
police take incapacitated individuals into protective custody), cited with approval in Schaffrath
v. Village of Buffalo Grove, No. 86-0880, slip op. (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 8, 1987).
107. A notable exception is the appellate court treatment in Curtis, which found a duty
under the negligent design theory but not the inadequate police patrol theory. 109 Ill. App. 3d
400, 440 N.E.2d 942. The Supreme Court eventually reversed on the design issue. Curtis v.
Court of Cook, 98 Ill. 2d 158, 456 N.E.2d 116 (1983).
108. Galuszynski, 131 Il. App. 3d at 509, 475 N.E.2d at 963; Mallder, 145 Ill. App. 3d at
813, 495 N.E.2d at 1358-59.
109. Lest this scenario be considered too exaggerated, consider Schuster v. City of New
York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). Defendant argued that it was
too speculative to presume that Schuster's death resulted from his cooperation with police and
their failure to provide him with protection. The court said this matter could not be determined
at the motion stage since it was possible that Schuster's murderer might be captured and the
cause of his act learned. If police solved the crime, in other words, it would help prove plaintiff's
case against the city.
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allegations that arguably find their basis in the failure to adequately provide
police protection.

